Defence Takes National Approach in Asia

The shape of the Asia-Pacific defence landscape continues to evolve as the ongoing moves to reorganise and re-equip armed forces in the region steadily gather momentum against the backdrop of recent economic growth – the credit crunch notwithstanding.

Although publicly the talk is of enhanced peace and stability, in private, a number of analysts point to the development of a burgeoning 'hidden' arms race. In particular, tactical weaponry and the enhancement of conventional warfare capabilities is the order of the day. Peaceful it may be, but no one it seems is taking too many chances.

Inevitably, the strategic importance of the region predicates a certain conflict of national interests and influence. After all, it is where the purview of four of the world's largest military machines – China, Japan, Russia and the US – overlap. With the addition of North and South Korea, these six countries account for some 65% of the global military expenditure.

In general, as a nation becomes more prosperous, it increases the proportion of GDP it allocates to its defence budget and the newly-successful Asian economies are proving to be no exception. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), total military spending in Asia and Oceania was worth $219bn in 2007 – an increase of more than 50% on the funding allocated ten years ago.

Clearly, such unprecedented spending levels represent a major potential opportunity for technology vendors. For international firms the attraction is that much brighter as high initial R&D costs for many of the sought-after systems effectively rule out domestic development programmes, leaving countries reliant on foreign procurement. As a result, business forum Asia-Pacific Defence and Security (APDS) predicts that the region will head the list for defence imports well into the next decade, with contracts estimated at some $104bn expected to be fulfilled.

Multilateral alliances

The security architecture within Asia-Pacific essentially comprises a distinctly mixed bag of overlapping arrangements, typified by a series of bilateral agreements and multilateral accords. As the US National Intelligence Council (NIC) points out in Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World – published in November 2008 – an increasing wave of regionalisation within the area as a whole has been lacking in the issue of defence.

The NIC analysis further suggests that the region's long-standing security issues are gradually becoming less important. At the same time, however, new concerns are replacing them – not least the spectre of competition and conflict over resources.

"Total military spending in Asia and Oceania was worth $219bn in 2007."

Nevertheless, alliances are being made and regional collaboration features in the national security policies of many constituent states. Some of these pacts are historic while others are new – or evolving – and though closer cooperation between the Indonesian and Thai Air Forces, for example, raises few eyebrows, developments in other relationships have fuelled concerns in different quarters.

For instance, the bilateral arrangement between Japan and the US has been expanding apace over the past ten years – culminating in their recent treaty on ballistic missile defence integration. These nations view this as an essential safeguard in the region but unsurprisingly it plays rather differently to a Chinese audience. This was a point emphasised in 2007 by China's deputy chief of general staff, Zhang Qinsheng, when speaking at a conference on Asia-Pacific security in Singapore. He noted that his country was, "worried this kind of deployment would destabilise Asia and create uncertainty in terms of regional stability and peace."

However, the growing military might, economic power and political influence of China itself is a source of disquiet to neighbouring states, not least because Beijing is already involved with territorial disputes of one sort or another with most of them. China's increased defence spending, particularly focused on naval expansion, has not gone unnoticed by its maritime neighbours. As a number of analysts have commented, it is precisely this fear of a significantly extended Chinese military sphere of influence that has, at least in part, helped precipitate some of the recent trends in regionalisation.

The role of Australia is also shaping up to be an interesting and potentially pivotal one, largely because its unique historical and geo-political position naturally places it astride many of the traditional old world / new world divides. In September, the country's Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd warned of the need to prepare for, the 'increased militarisation' of the region and the likely importance that food, water and energy resources will assume as the Asia-Pacific population grows. Yet, despite pledging increased military spending to 2017-18 to meet this goal, he is also looking to extend the existing political links with Australia's neighbours to the north.

Although Rudd has described the country's long-standing alliance with the US as, "the bedrock of our strategic policy," – and something which is set to remain – he has also signalled an intent to engage with the rest of Asia-Pacific to establish a comprehensive approach to defence. There is already a consensus of method and Rudd's Australia, like the other countries of the region, will be looking to acquire appropriate military technology to help ensure future security.

Technology shopping spree

"Australia will be looking to acquire appropriate military technology to help ensure future security."

It is an obvious truism that the Pacific is as much the defining feature of regional challenges as it is of the region itself. The littoral states of Southeast Asia have a collective surface area which is less than a third that of the continental US – but a combined coastal perimeter some six times larger.

From the perspective of national security, such long coastlines equate to serious operational challenges. This, coupled with the inherent difficulties which surround despatching conventional ground forces to remote and inaccessible reaches of the seaboard, make border integrity difficult – if not impossible – to maintain.

Add the vital economic importance of sea-lanes to the burgeoning economies of the region and a focus on enhanced naval power is the inevitable corollary.

But the technology shopping spree has already begun. In 2007, Singapore commissioned its first Formidable Class frigate and at the same time Indonesia entered into a loan agreement to purchase Russian equipment including Kilo Class submarines and is now investigating possible Chinese help to acquire or develop their own cruise missiles.

China's own naval expansion over the period has seen investment in a new fleet of submarines and the procurement of advanced naval mines. However, no matter how effective a navy, ultimately territorial security depends on the ability to occupy ground. In a region widely beset with militant separatist factions, jihadist terrorists and pirates, this task asks much of respective national armies.

Situational awareness

As the region's nation-states have continued to update and extend their conventional war-fighting capabilities, a greater understanding of the importance of situational awareness on the modern battlefield has increasingly been developed. Consequently, with military thinking shifting towards networked defence strategies, network-centric warfare (NCW) systems have become one of the major growth areas on the procurement wish list.

Geospatial mapping technologies in particular seem to hold particular promise in meeting some of the region's military challenges by maximising the opportunity for tactical and operational use of data within an evolving battle space. Additionally, for the relatively smaller regional players it holds the key to improving the collaboration and interoperability between individual ground force units and with air or sea forces, so facilitating their integration into a seamless response.

"Network-centric warfare (NCW) systems have become one of the major growth areas on the procurement wish list."

These NCW developments on the ground are also being matched with better intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability in the air, with airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft and improved radar systems in particular being prioritised. In 2007 alone, the Asia Pacific ISR radar market was worth $381m and is expected to rise to $432m by 2014, according to analysts at Frost & Sullivan.

With the long-term strategic role of China remaining unclear and future US involvement in the region widely expected to be scaled down over the coming decades, defence remains a key issue, which is good news for the defence exporters of the world, particularly in the current economic downturn.

There may not yet be a full-blown Asia-Pacific arms race but it is clear that many of the nations are keeping a careful eye on what their neighbours are doing and responding appropriately. Despite the reassuring evidence of rising levels of cooperation it seems they have learnt the lessons of history; the interdependence of nations is no guarantor of peace.

Antibodies for Biological Warfare : biotechnology

Since the days of antiquity, biological warfare has been part of many conflicts between states and nations. It is thought that the ancient Anatolian Hittites were the first to make use of biological warfare by driving the victims of plague into the lands of their enemies with the aim of inflicting deathly illnesses on them during the 18th century.

Centuries later, biological warfare was prohibited by the Geneva Accord of 1925 and following its use by both Germany and Japan during World War Two, it came into greater disrepute.

This led to the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction – better known as the biological weapons convention (BWC). This was the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning the production of an entire category of weapons, which came into force on 25 March 1975.

However, even during this time, work at Porton Down, UK and at Fort Detrick, Maryland, US, meant that by 1941 a number of diseases such as tularemia, anthrax, brucellosis and botulism toxin had been developed as potential weapons. Work continued on such arsenal during the Cold War period but it has only been Agent Orange – a herbicidal spray used to destroy crops – that has since been used on a wide scale by a government military when it was exploited in Vietnam between 1961 and 1971.

Porton Down research

Although the development and production of biological weapons is banned by international treaty, research has continued due to the justified fear that either a rogue state or a terrorist group might make use of such agents. The use of chemical weapons by Saddam Hussein's forces in Halabja in 1988 and the release of Sarin Gas on the Tokyo subway in 1995 by the Aum Shinrikyo cult highlight this fear all too well. These events resulted in a strong emphasis on the development of countermeasures and antidotes to respond to biological warfare threats by technologically advanced states, including the UK.

The Porton Down centre focuses on research into chemical, biological, radiological as well as nuclear warfare and is known as the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl). The Dstl is an executive agency of the Ministry of Defence and is situated in a 7,000-acre site that also houses Ploughshares Innovations, a subsidiary of the Dstl, which develops civilian applications for military biotechnology.

The Dstl conducts research into all aspects of biotechnology that might have a military application and does not confine itself to the so called weaponisation of existing diseases or other potential biological threats. A spokesperson for the Dstl says it views biotechnology as: "A broad term that encompasses a very wide range of procedures for modifying biological organisms to aid humanity - perhaps to improve human and animal health, increase food production or to manage the environment." Put another way, the Dstl develops countermeasures to potential threats due to biological warfare.

"Biological warfare was prohibited by the Geneva Accord of 1925."

The Dstl's work is very varied as potential threats are complex and multifarious in their nature. What all have in common is that they demand a high degree of scientific rigour that often leads to a civilian application at a later date.

"Across the world there are significant areas of land contaminated by explosives and/or chemical warfare agents.

"Dstl, in collaboration with UK universities, develops strains of micro-organisms able to degrade these contaminates. This type of bioremediation is gaining popularity as the old way of 'dig and dump' becomes increasingly unacceptable," says a spokesperson for the centre.

Exploiting biotechnology's commercial potential

In 2005 Ploughshare Innovations was established to bridge the gap between the military-focused applications of the work the Dstl was undertaking and its possible potential in civilian life. It was founded with the mission statement, 'To actively pursue the commercial exploitation of publicly funded research for the benefit of all'. In practice it takes intellectual properties developed by the Dstl and develops them for the civilian market.

Ploughshare is owned by the MoD and has access to the outputs of MoD-funded research carried out by the Dstl. "It also runs its own proof of concept fund, financed through its balance sheet, to de-risk the Dstl outputs for commercial exploitation outside of MoD defence procurement. Often the military objectives and data are not wholly suited to the wider commercial world and the fund can make the difference to convince industry to take on the technology," says a Ploughshare spokesperson.

Although Ploughshare Innovations can commercialise many of the developments made by the Dtsl, the core of the parent body's work remains firmly linked to military defence in the field of biotechnology. A spokesperson for Dtsl says: "Our scientists created the key components in vaccines to protect frontline troops against anthrax and plague and this work could not have been done without biotechnology. Also, there are many biological detection systems that rely on components created by biotechnology – without these we would not know that a threat is present."

Biotechnology typically provides the only route to a solution for a complex problem and these solutions can reduce the risks for troops. For example, Dstl is working on a vaccine for Tularemia that was first weaponised decades ago. "Very few bacteria are needed to cause serious disease," says Dstl Professor Petra Oyston. "Because of this and the fact that tularemia can be contracted by inhalation, Francisella tularensis has been designated a potential biological weapon. Since the events of September 2001 and the subsequent anthrax attacks on the US, concern about the potential misuse of dangerous pathogens including F tularensis has increased. As a result, more funding has been made available for research on these organisms and has accelerated progress on developing medical countermeasures."

"Concern about the potential misuse of dangerous pathogens including F tularensis has increased."

If inhaled tularemia can have a mortality rate of up to 30%, this necessitates the development of effective countermeasures that Dtsl can produce. "Progress is being made. Since the genome of F tularensis was sequenced, researchers have taken great strides in understanding the molecular basis for its pathogenesis," says Oyston.

"This is essential information for developing a vaccine and getting it licensed. Recently genes needed by F tularensis for growth and survival have been identified. These could be targets for novel antimicrobial development or could be used in the production of a vaccine."

All of this points to the development of a vaccine that would protect not only soldiers in combat zones but also civilian populations exposed to the disease due to the actions of rogue states or terrorists.

The succession of spin-offs that have been achieved by Ploughshare Innovations hints at successful commercialisation. Vaccines developed for one disease can often lead to research breakthroughs that can more effectively combat other diseases. Humanity has come a long way since the days when the unfortunate victims of the Hittites had no defence against plague. It can be expected that further defences and countermeasures will be developed in the near future and that eventually biological warfare will be a thing long forgotten.

India's Missiles Fly Up the Learning Curve : strategic missile capability

A truism in many sports holds that offence gets headlines, but defence wins championships. Although it is only roughly analogous to sport, war and military technology exhibits the same skew in media coverage, as the evolution of India's strategic missile capability shows. Judging by recent test results, the second half of the equation may hold as well.

The defence doesn't rest: programmatic outperformance

Sandwiched between successful 2009 trials of the BrahMos cruise missile on 5 March and the Prithvi II nuclear-capable SRBM in mid-April, the 7 March test of an indigenous ABM missile was equally successful in terms of test objectives (although it received a fraction of the coverage, judging from Google hit statistics). Taken in programmatic context, however, the ABM test is much more impressive in three ways: success rate, development speed and technical challenge.

Success rate

So far India has gone three for three in ABM interceptor flight trials, each of which had a different test profile. In the first trial, a two-stage interceptor missile later named the Pradyumna incapacitated the target, an incoming Prithvi-II missile, at the upper edge of the stratosphere, 48km up. A year later, a single-stage missile developed under the advanced air defence (AAD) programme defeated another Prithvi-II 15km up (the altitude of many transcontinental plane flights). In the most recent test, another Pradyumna sporting improvements such as a gimballed directional warhead achieved an explosive kill of its target at an altitude of 75km, well into the mesosphere.

"India's ABM test is impressive in three ways: success rate, development speed and technical challenge."

In contrast, the Prithvi SRBM itself failed three of its first six trials, and the newer Agni-III MRBM failed its first test. Failure rates of 50% in the first few tests of new weapons are neither unusual nor portents of ultimate futility, but this makes the Indian BMD track record even more impressive.

Development speed

India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) publicly revealed its BMD programme right after the first test in November 2006, less than three years ago.

At that time, Indian programme managers conceded that BMD research had been underway 'for years', but given that DRDO had tried diligently to make the Trishul SAM work in ABM mode for years, as well, the Pradyumna programme couldn't have been DRDO's primary initiative. In any event, ABM weapon testing could be completed by 2010 given current rates of progress, according to VK Saraswat, head of missile development at DRDO.

In contrast, DRDO has pursued offensive ballistic missile development since 1983, when it initiated the integrated guided missile development programme (IGMDP). Even now, according to one Indian commentator, the Agni-I is the only fully operational nuclear-capable ballistic missile in India's arsenal. Most of this protracted development cycle has consisted of post-testing production and field integration delays, which should quell undue optimism about the young BMD programme, but even so, both ABM interceptors are ahead of all previous IGMDP timetables.

Technical challenge

Judging technical difficulty of a mission by the number of nations that can execute it, BMD is the most challenging military task, as only the US and Russia have independently fielded fully indigenous BMD systems (the Israeli Arrow is a US-Israel joint venture). The anti-satellite task is actually second (US, Russia, and China), and long-range ballistic missiles currently run third, although this club seems to be in the process of doubling.

If any nation can benefit from BMD, it's India

Indeed, ballistic missile proliferation in Asia makes India's BMD programme even more significant in the long term than its offensive nuclear ballistic missile programmes.

"So far India has gone three for three in anti-ballistic missile interceptor flight trials, each of which had a different test profile."

First and foremost, the November 2008 Mumbai attack and the current spread of Taliban influence in Pakistan have raised the spectre of Pakistani missiles and/or nuclear warheads falling into the hands of terrorists, against whom traditional deterrence is at best uncertain.

Beyond the Pakistani threat, whether national or subnational, India's offensive ballistic missile programme lags behind that of its main regional rival, China. Although DRDO has improved its success rate for offensive tests recently, China has just as much momentum and occupies a more advanced position, especially in terms of long-range ICBMs either operational or in the pipeline.

BMD is therefore India's most likely countervailing asset in the foreseeable future. China's high-altitude SAMs can engage some ballistic missiles, but only to a 30km ceiling, and evidently China has no R&D effort comparable to India's BMD programme at this time. In this respect, China's ASAT capability doesn't really count, as ballistic missiles are to satellites as fighter aircraft are to armoured personnel carriers. Last but not least, India is significantly better than China at software development and programming, which are critical to BMD system effectiveness.

Finally, India itself lags in deploying submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad. Should India's naval missile programme follow the same timetable as India's other strategic naval and missile programmes, a BMD capability could add significant survivability to India's nuclear deterrent.

Can failure breed success?

To be fair, India's offensive ballistic missiles don't deserve direct managerial comparison to the BMD programme. As noted previously, the BMD programme hasn't yet reached the point where Indian R&D usually derails; as Saraswat himself cautioned, deployment rates are 'not in [DRDO's] hands'.

"Failure rates of 50% in the first few tests of new weapons are neither unusual nor portents of ultimate futility."

More important, early failures pave the way to ultimate success: as Thomas Edison said in response to derision at the thousandth failure of the prototype light bulb: 'now we know a thousand ways that it won't work'. Current BMD development benefits from the advances and setbacks of IGMDP, which included the Akash and Prithul SAM projects as well as the Agni and Prithvi. In fact, the Pradyumna ABM was originally called the Prithvi air defence (PAD) missile because it used the generic Prithvi missile design. Conversely, the DRDO strenuously attempted to give the Prithul ABM capability before ultimately admitting failure.

However, other factors may underpin programmatic BMD outperformance. In no particular order:

• The one way in which interceptor missiles are less complex than offensive ballistic missiles is that modern versions of the former don't carry nuclear warheads.
• The BMD was not developed under the auspices of IGMPD, suggesting that the latter may have been (or would become) too bureaucratic.
• The BMD programme not only post-dated the IGMPD, but also probably started during, and quite possibly because of, the ramping up of Pakistan's missile capability. In this regard, the 1999 Kargil conflict occurred just a year after Pakistan detonated its first nuclear munition.

Is true danger the mother of efficiency?

There is in fact an exact historical precedent for the correlation of serious perceived threat and speedy weapons development: the first generation of US strategic nuclear missiles.

By 1952, nuclear warheads had become small enough to put on missiles, but the US missile programmes did not really kick into high gear until 1957, when the Sputnik launch, along with faster-than-expected Soviet development of its first ICBM (the SS-6), created fears of a Soviet-US 'missile gap'. Consequently, the USAF and USN made development of ICBM and SLBM systems their top priority, creating all-star teams of scientists and engineers with essentially unlimited resources.

The effect of concentrating talent, subordinating bureaucratic processes to a tight deadline, enabled by top-level political support and underpinned by strong psychological fear, produced results. A 1958 US catch-up plan called for full operational deployment of nine Atlas squadrons and four Titan squadrons by March 1963. By October 1961, the Strategic Air Command subsequently activated 13 Atlas and six Titan squadrons – 18 months early. The Polaris SLBM project was similarly successful: the first successful test launch was in 1960, just four years from project initiation, and IOC occurred in 1961.

"India's ballistic missile programme lags behind that of its main regional rival – China."

In contrast, the second generation of US strategic nuclear weapons systems came in behind schedule, over budget, and arguably under promised capability – at a time when nuclear weapons had become much more survivable and effective in their deterrent role.

If past is prologue, then India's long record of military procurement frustration might be ending – at least in the strategic nuclear weapons space. Indeed, the DRDO is on a roll with its recent tests of offensive missiles; even the January 2009 BrahMos test failure was rectified within weeks.

In the end, the best military procurement principle may have come from essayist Samuel Johnson: 'nothing so wonderfully concentrates the mind as the prospect of hanging in the morning'.